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RECENT CASE NOTES
ESrOPPEL-CONTINUANCE

IN DEFENSE OF ACTION NOT COVERED BY POLICY-

Appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, issued a
policy to appellee, insuring him against losses and claims growing out of
accidents and injuries sustained in the operation of his automobile.
Under
clause E of the policy if suit was brought against the insured, the company
agreed at its own expense to defend such suit in the name and on behalf
of the assured, but there was no liability for injuries to those in the employment of the insured. In an action against the insured the appellant undertook
the defense of the suit without knowledge of the fact of employment of the
injured person. Appellant discovered the fact on trial, moved that the cause
be continued because of the changed issue, and notified the appellee that it
disclaimed liability under such facts and offered to withdraw from the
defense if the appellee so desired. Appellee, however, directed the appellant
to continue in the case in cooperation with attorneys employed by the appellee
at the time the suit was filed. Held, "no estoppel arises where, although
defending the suit against the insured, the insurance company insists on its
non-liability under the policy, and its defense of the suit is merely to protect
itself and comply with its agreement." "The appellant did not waive its
rights under the terms of the policy. To constitute a waiver, it must be an
intentional relinquishment of the right, which ordinarily must be predicated
on full knowledge of all the facts."l
Whether or not the court is correct in its use of the term "waiver," when
2
it states that "waiver" is the intentional relinquishment of a right, it is
submitted that the decision conforms with the views pronounced by courts
of other states. 3 The court points out the rule that an insurer by assuming
and conducting the defense of an action brought against the insured, with
knowledge of the fact of non-coverage, and without disclaiming liability, is
thereafter estopped to set up this defense in an action on the policy. 4 But
it further states that no estoppel arises where, although defending the suit
against the insured, it insists on its non-liability under the policy and its
defense of the suit is merely to protect itself and comply with its agreement.
Thus the court recognized a duty on the part of the insurer, arising from
the contract of insurance, to defend suits against the insured even though
the cause of action will not render the company liable under the policy. 5
If clause E of the policy is interpreted to mean that the insurance company
1 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Phillips (1936), - Ind. -2 N. E. (2d) 989.
2 Ewart, Waiver Distributed (1917); Vance, Insurance (1930) Chap. 9;
Ewart, Waiver in Insurance Cases (1905), 18 Harv. L. Rev. 365.
3 Ferry v. National Motor Underwriters (1927), 244 Ill.
App. 241; Liddell
v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. (1933), 283 Mass. 340, 187 N. E. 39; O'Roak v.
Lloyds Casualty Co. (1934), 283 Mass. 532, 189 N. E. 571; Morrison v. Royal
Indemnity Co. (1917), 167 N. Y. S.732, 180 App. Div. 709; S. & E. Motor Hire
Corporation v. New York Indemnity Company (1930), 255 N. Y. 69, 174
N. E.
65.
4
patterson v. Adan (1912), 119 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 231; Oehme v.
Johnson (1930), 181 Minn. 138, 231 N. W. 817; S. & E. Motor Hire Corporation
v. New York Indemnity Company (1930), 255 N. Y. 69, 174 N. E. 65 (reversed
because of lack of knowledge on insurer's part, but accepting the rule as well
established).
5 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Phillips (1936), - Ind. -,
2 N. E. (2d) 989.
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has a duty to defend all suits brought against the insured, regardless of
liability, would it not be a strange quirk of law to hold that one who is
performing a duty which he is required to perform by contract is by the
very performance of that duty held to have become estopped to assert a
defense, which would have existed had he not performed the duty? Such a
decision would require an insurer who, as it would seem in this case, had
agreed to assume liability for certain types of risks and to defend all suits
brought against the insured, to elect between two evils. It could elect to
defend all suits and by so doing would be estopped as to the defense of noncoverage, or it could refuse to defend and become liable to the insured in a
contract action. Such would be the undesirable result of the contention of
the appellee.
If, on the other hand, the clause is interpreted to mean that the insurer is
required to defend only those suits based on a cause of action for which it
will be liable if recovery is had, then, there being no duty to defend, the
appellee might well say estoppel or "waiver." As has been shown, there are
many cases holding that the assumption and continuance in the defense of a
suit, where the defense of non-coverage exists, and where the insurer had
knowledge of that defense but did not assert it, preclude the insurer from
asserting it.(
However, the court correctly points out that knowledge of the facts which
take the injury out of the policy at the time the insurer assumes or continues
the defense is the important element. In the present case the insurer did not
know of the facts until they appeared on trial. Thus the more applicable rule
7
Further, if, as the court points
is that announced by the New York courts.
out, the knowledge of the fact of non-coverage is the important element in
determining whether there is an estoppel or not, it would seem that the decisions
of the Massachusetts court are in point. Those cases differ from the instant
case in that there was a written non-waiver agreement, disclaiming liability,
entered into prior to the assumption of the defense, but with full knowledge
of the non-liability. In such cases the court said that acts in connection with
the claim and litigation arising out of the accident should not be construed
as an admission by the insurer that the accident was covered by the policy.
A course of conduct by an insurer which might otherwise constitute an
admission of liability or waiver is not to be so construed when taken pursuant
8
In the present case there
to an agreement that it shall not have that effect.
was an oral disclaimer of liability made after assumption of the defense but
immediately upon the acquiring of knowledge of the fact of non-coverage,
and this disclaimer was followed by an offer to withdraw or to continue in
the defense at the election of the appellee. If, as the assumption is made,
there was no duty on the appellant to continue after it had knowledge of the
non-coverage, the election of the appellee may be construed as making an
OPatterson v. Adan (1912), 119 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 281; Oehme v.
Johnson (1930), 181 Minn. 138, 231 N. W. 817; S. & E. Motor Hire Corporation
v. New York Indemnity Company (1930), 255 N. Y. 69, 174 N. E. 65.
7 Morrison v. Royal Indemnity Co. (1917), 180 App. Div. 709, 167 N. Y. S.
732; S. & E. Motor Hire Corporation v. New York Indemnity Company (1930),
255 N. Y. 69, 174 N. E. 65.
8 Liddell v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. (1933), 283 Mass. 340, 187 N. E. 39;
O'Roak v. Lloyds Casualty Co. (1934), 283 Mass. 532, 189 N. E. 571.
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agreement binding on the parties, and would fall within the rule of the
Massachusetts cases and the conduct on the part of the insurer was not to be
construed to be a waiver or admission of liability when taken pursuant to
P. D. E.
the agreement.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-DEMAND

FOR PERFORMANCE.-Appellant's

assignor

contracted to sell a Florida lot to appellee for $3,600 and to deliver a deed
when one-fourth of the purchase price had been paid. Appellee made the
requisite payment September 28 1925, but neither received nor demanded a
deed. Thereafter, appellee executed and returned to the vendor six promissory
notes and a mortgage. On March 26, 1926, appellee paid the first note, still
neither demanding nor receiving a deed. When the second note matured,
September, 1926, appellee refused to pay it on the ground that the vendor had
breached his contract by failing to deliver a deed when one-fourth of the
purchase price was paid. Though demands were made upon him as the
other notes matured, appellee made no further payments. On March 29, 1927,
the vendor wrote that it had been advised appellee had never received a deed
and that it had had one placed on record for him. Vendor assigned the five unpaid notes to appellant after maturity. Appellant sues thereon. Held, purchaser
not relieved from liability on purchase-money notes on ground of vendor's
breach of contract by failure to deliver deed at time stipulated or reasonably
soon thereafter, in absence of notice by purchaser to convey or demand for
conveyance and refusal by vendor to convey.1
The answer to the question as to when demand for performance of a
contract is necessary in order to put the other party in default, varies with
the several possible variations in the provisions of the contract. Time may
have been made of the essence of the contract. Time as the essence may have
been waived by the party entitled to performance. A reasonable time may
have been allowed. Again, one party may have acquiesced in the other
party's delay. The contract may not have fixed any time for performance.
When time has been made of the essence of a contract and there has been
no waiver of that condition by the party entitled to its performance, no demand
is necessary in order to put the other party in default when he has allowed
2
the time to go by without performing.
But when time has not been made of the essence or when no time has been
fixed at all, in which cases a reasonable time is allowed for performance, a
3
This position would seem to be supported
demand appears to be necessary.
9 Contracts Restatement, Sec. 20; Sec. 29.
1 Allah Farms, Inc. v. Homer (1936), - Ind. App. -, 200 N. E. 740.
2 Richard v. Reeves (1898), 149 Ind. 427, 49 N. E. 348; Frazee v. McChord
(1848), 1 Ind. 224; Boldt v. Early (1904), 33 Ind. App. 434; Wheeler v. Garsia
(1867), 28 N. Y. Super. Ct. (5 Rob.) 280; Negus v. Simpson (1863), 99 Mass.
388; 13 C. J. 660; Gray v. Robertson (1898), 174 Ill. 242, 51 N. E. 248.
3Sheets v. Andrews (1829), 2 Blackf 274; Mather v. Scoles (1870),
35 Ind. 1; Sapinsky v. Jefferson County Construction Company (1923),
79 Ind. App. 557, 131 N. E. 846; Goodman v. Gordon (1882), 87 Ind. 126;
Frazee v. McChord (1848), 1 Ind. 224; Worley v. Mourning (1808), 4 Ky.
(1 Bibb.) 254; Adkins v. Ferrell (1897), 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1082, 42 S. W. 1145;
Weller v. Tuthill (1876), 66 N. Y. 347; Myers v. DeMier (1873), 52 N. Y. 647;
Northup v. Scott (1914), 148 N. Y. S. 846, 85 Misc. Rep. 515; McNamara v.
Pengilly (1894), 58 Minn. 353, 59 N. W. 1055; Walters v. Miller (1860), 10
Iowa 427; Gammon v. Bunnell (1900), 22 Utah 421, 64 P. 958; Fuller v. Hub-

